Platform selection by software developers: Theory and evidence

This paper analyzes platform selection (affiliation) by game developers in the Japanese home video game industry. We develop an elementary model of affiliation by software developers and propose the hypothesis that wider availability of game titles for a platform positively inclines game developers to affiliate with that platform when releasing new game titles. Then, using data for Japan, we estimate a multinomial logit model that includes both the attributes of game developers and the characteristics of platforms, and find evidence supporting this hypothesis. Overall, the findings suggest that game developers expect the indirect network effect to apply, and the prospect of future growth matters to them when deciding with which platform to affiliate.     

中小科技企业低碳生产战略抉择的政企博弈模型分析

由于中小科技企业低碳生产受制于企业自主战略和外部环境两种因素,因此,科技企业履行低碳生产的社会责任行为,不仅包括在非市场环境中科技企业出于商业利益和社会营销考虑而自主实行的低碳行为,也包括受到利益相关者压力而被动采用的低碳行为。随着外部政策环境的明朗,科技企业低碳生产管理更加具有企业自发性。本文运用博弈论模型,将科技企业低碳生产管理与博弈论紧密结合起来分析,得出政企博弈纯策略和混合策略两种模型,从科技企业管理层面,为科技企业融入企业社会责任、规范合法经营提供了可行的管理指导。     

抵押物处置与农房抵押贷款困境：基于演化博弈的分析

研究目的:分析农民住房财产权抵押(简称农房抵押)贷款困境的主要原因以及抵押物处置对农房抵押贷款行为的影响机理。研究方法:演化博弈论。研究结果:农房抵押贷款发展面临困境的关键在于金融机构惜贷,而抵押物处置难是激发金融机构惜贷的重要原因,但是降低抵押物处置难度只是推动农房抵押贷款发展的必要而非充分条件。研究结论:要促进农房抵押贷款发展,除了必须降低抵押物处置难度外,还需要构建完善的农房抵押贷款制度体系。     

基于环境保护问题的政府与企业博弈优化分析及对策建议

在中国特色社会主义生态文明建设中,环境保护是当今社会重大课题;而环境保护关乎经济发展、社会责任等多个方面,涉及政府、企业、公众多个群体.因此,如何通过有效的机制均衡各群体以做好环境保护工作一直是国家所关注的.通过分析当今情境下政府和企业的博弈过程,研究政府与企业博弈的优化问题,并在此基础上提出相应的解决环境保护问题的对策建议.     

On axiomatizations of the Shapley value for assignment games

We consider the problem of axiomatizing the Shapley value on the class of assignment games. It turns out that several axiomatizations of the Shapley value on the class of all TU-games do not characterize this solution on the class of assignment games. However, when considering an assignment game as a (communication) graph game where the game is simply the assignment game and the graph is a corresponding bipartite graph where buyers (sellers) are connected with sellers (buyers) only, we show that Myerson’s component efficiency and fairness axioms do characterize the Shapley value on the class of assignment games. Moreover, these two axioms have a natural interpretation for assignment games. Component efficiency yields submarket efficiency stating that the sum of the payoffs of all players in a submarket equals the worth of that submarket, where a submarket is a set of buyers and sellers such that all buyers in this set have zero valuation for the goods offered by the sellers outside the set, and all buyers outside the set have zero valuations for the goods offered by sellers inside the set. Fairness of the graph game solution boils down to valuation fairness stating that only changing the valuation of one particular buyer for the good offered by a particular seller changes the payoffs of this buyer and seller by the same amount.     

Designing futures: Inquiry in climate change communication

There are many barriers and challenges associated with climate change communication focused on promoting community-based action for sustainable futures. Of particular interest is the challenge to embed community perspectives in a communication process of climate change solutions. In this paper we argue that 3D interactive simulations using design inquiry as a development process, can be an effective way of communicating climate change solutions and multiple community responses. People are more likely to engage with the challenges associated with complexity of climate change at the local level when their perspectives are integrated into viable and multiple pathways for action. Future scenarios of change processes situated in local experiences in compelling and interactive ways can be disseminated holistically by making links between scientific, social, political, economic and cultural elements. Design inquiry, as a research approach, integrates contextual knowledge into communication processes to aid imagining, re-thinking and reembodying viable pathways that explore the kinds of futures we collectively envision. This paper examines the contributions that design inquiry makes to climate change communication using an interactive simulation environment for designing futures. We discuss these ideas using the example of the Future Delta project, a virtual 3D environment that enables the exploration and simulation of multiple community-based climate change solutions in the Corporation of Delta, British Columbia.     

Two-period supply chain coordination strategies with ambidextrous sustainable innovations

This study considers a manufacturer with ambidextrous sustainable innovation capability selling products in environmentally conscious market through an independent retailer in a two-period game setting. We design a two-period game theoretic and dyadic supply chain (SC) model considering exploitative and exploratory nature of environmental innovations. We study five different contract types, namely, wholesale price contract, vertical Nash game structure, cost sharing contract, revenue sharing contract and two-part tariff contract. We demonstrate the impact of market sensitivity towards sustainable innovation and cost parameters on optimal level of decision parameters. The equilibrium results reveal that a suitably designed two-part tariff contract can be used to achieve coordination in a fragmented SC. The equilibrium results assist managers to optimise the SC based on the two-period contract model. The results obtained in this study can help the decision-makers to take decisions on investment in the ambidextrous sustainable innovation under different types of contract structures.     

Cooperative game analysis of coordination mechanisms under fairness concerns of a green retailer

This study discusses how a green retailer's fairness concerns affect product greenness and profit and explores how to distribute surplus profits under the fairness concerns using cooperative game theory. Research findings indicate that cooperation contributes to increasing channel profits and improving product greenness, but the fairness concerns are detrimental to them. The three proposed coordination mechanisms (SVM, NSM, and TVM) are feasible to ensure coalition stability, but their beneficiaries differ. NSM benefits a manufacturer, while SVM benefits retailers. Additionally, the green retailer's fairness concerns serve as distribution tools to narrow profit gaps between the manufacturer and the green retailer.     

基于协议代理模式下IT外包项目博弈研究

互联网经济的出现致使全球信息化水平向更高级的智能化延伸。IT外包项目对现代企业的作用毋需置疑。本文通过建立了IT外包公司与地方系统集成商间单委托—代理博弈模型,分析了双方间的IT外包项目分包费率和努力程度取值范围,并讨论了IT外包公司和地方系统集成商的行为选择。对IT外包项目的博弈分析结果对于信息化建设企业未来在外包决策时进行风险控制具有一定的借鉴意义。     

基于云重心Shapley值的供应链融资联盟收益分配研究

针对Shapley值法在供应链融资联盟收益分配过程中分配因素考虑不全以及各分配因素随机性和模糊性强的缺点，本文利用云重心法修正Shapley值的收益分配。根据供应链融资联盟收益分配的主要影响因素，在传统的Shapley值法的基础上引入了风险系数、投入成本、努力程度以及信息对称水平4个分配修正因子，弥补了影响因素的缺失，并利用云重心法计算各联盟企业的收益修正值，云重心法能够解决定性指标和定量指标之间的模糊性转换，极大克服了Shapley值法自身的局限性。算例对比结果发现，改进的Shapley值法能更加合理的分配收益，有利于维持供应链融资联盟的稳定。